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9. Secularism and India's integrity
9.1 Separatism and anti-Hinduism
In the present context, the link between history-writing
and actual politics is extra-ordinarily strong. Witness
the crucial role of the Aryan invasions theory in the
secularist and casteist/Ambedkarist ideologies, as
earlier in the missionary and colonial ideologies. In
fact, I can not think of any situation in world history
where history-writing was so intertwined with both long-
term political philosophy and short-term political
equations. This is partly because an unusually large
chunk of India's history is fundamentally under debate,
either because it has not yet been mapped (so many
unknowns may be decided on overnight once the Indus
script is conclusively deciphered), or because it has
been questioned for ideological reasons even while well-
established (like the denial of Islam's utterly
destructive role). Nowhere else can so much be read into
history according to one's ideological compulsions,
because nowhere else is so much history so undecided and
disputed.
This link between the two, history and politics, works in
both directions. Secularism as a political philosophy is
intellectually dependent upon the secularist version of
history. Conversely, once secularism as the official
state ideology is fully discredited, secularist history-
writing cannot survive for long. Now in fact, Nehruvian
secularism as a political philosophy has effectively lost
its credibility. It has proven worthless as a national
motivating force and as a moral framework, judging by the
many forms of corruption at every level. It has proven
unable to create a secular national unity (Bharatiyatva,
Indian-ness). Secularists go on lambasting the Ram
devotees that with their Janmabhoomi demand they cannot
expect the minorities to remain in India, that they are
driving the minorities to separatism. This contention
unfortunately draws an objective outsider's attention to
the fact that these minority separatisms are already
there.
There are Muslim, Sikh, Communist and Christian
separatist movements who carry on an armed struggle
against the Indian secular republic. The Dravidian
movement in Tamil Nadu has, after the Chinese invasion in
1962, decided to limit itself to demands within the
Constitution, and to drop its separatism ; however, with
the DMK talking of the need to go back to the roots,
and depending on the outcome for the Tamils in Sri Lanka,
it might reassert its separatist tendencies. It is
significant that it was Annadurai, the least anti-Hindu
among the Dravidian leaders (he supported the RSS in
putting up the Vivekananda Rock Memorial, against the
Christians) who called off the separatist programme.
There are also Dalit fringe groups who demand a separate
Dalitastan or Achootistan. Some of these groups are
militantly atheist (like the Dravidian movement), some
are Christian-or Muslim-leaning, some profess Buddhism of
the Ambedkarite variety. The one thing that all these
separatist movements without exception have in common at
the ideological level, is their hatred of Hinduism.
Every separatist movement in India is an anti-Hindu
movement.
In fact, as I write this, the papers report on pamphlets
being spread among the tribals in Gujarat, demanding for
a separate tribal state Bhilistan, as well as for five
more tribal states in other parts of India. And what is
the punch line in the pamphlet ? Exactly : "We are not
Hindus". Of course, the number of tribals rallied behind
this demand may not exceed a handful, but the point that
separatism in India invariably implies anti-Hinduism is
certainly corroborated.
The Hindus may profess secularism as much as they want :
for their enemies they are still too Hindu. And their
enemies will try to separate from them from the very day
they feel strong enough to do it, in order to create a
Pakistan, a Khalistan etc. Secularism, which is purely a
negative ideology, which merely divorces one of the
strongest motivating forces in an individual's life from
public life, is proving incapable of overcoming these
separatisms.
I am not saying that all minorities ipso facto harbour
separatist tendencies and will invariably launch a
separatist movement if strategically given a chance. The
Parsis or the Jains are not going to start their own
Khalistan agitation, I am sure. The ordinary members of
the Christian community, everywhere where it is living
mixed with other communities (i.e. except in parts of the
Northeast), have a constructive attitude and are, as far
as I can see, increasingly being absorbed into the
mainstream. Among the Sikhs too, the separatist
movement can still not claim a majority of the community
as supporters of the Khalistan cause. And among the
Muslims, it is only in Kashmir that they massively
support separation from India. I have to agree with the
remark of some secularist, that the Muslims who stayed
behind in India in 1947, in a sense "voted for India with
their feet". All I am saying is that those who are bent
on creating a separate communal state, will want to do so
regardless of whether the Hindus call themselves Hindu or
secular.
Therefore, V.P. Singh missed the point when he declared
on Doordarshan (with an explicitness that bordered on
incitement) that, if the Hindus claimed the Ram
Janmabhoomi, there was no ground for stopping the Sikhs
from demanding Khalistan, and other such separatist
demands. The separatists have not waited until the Hindu
mobilization for Ram Janmabhoomi to start their anti-
India movement ;nor will they call it off if the Hindus
call off the Janmabhoomi campaign.
9.2 Secularist-separatist nexus
The nexus between the anti-Janmabhoomi demand and anti-
Hindu separatism, has been worked out more closely by
Tavleen Singh in her article Apocalypse Soon.122 Let
us
take a close look at her analysis and prediction. She
starts out by mentioning the opinion, fairly common in
Pakistan, that India should be partitioned once more, and
a big chunk of the North given to the India Muslims.
Since Ayodhya, she thinks that this prospect has acquired
a grim chance of materialization. After all, the VHP
Hindus have become so fanatical that they think : "We
will have to get rid of these Muslims. They must be
kicked out and sent to Pakistan, after all it was made
for them." So, on the Hindu side, we have strong words.
On the Muslim side, according to Tavleen Singh, the
radicalization has already gone a big step further. Just
a week before, the Muslim Personal Law Board has issued a
religious sanction to fight, if necessary, for the Babri
Masjid. "All God-fearing Muslims will consider it their
religious duty to participate in the new jihad. This
would lead automatically to the internationalizing of the
dispute... If the mosque is knocked down, [not only
Pakistan but] many an oil-fat Arab country would be only
too willing to come to the defense of the faith."
What is our secularist commentator implying ? That India
should let its policy on Ayodhya be sidetracked at the
Muslim countries' gunpoint ? Politically, it is a
concession (i.e. a reward and an encouragement) to
threats of coercion and aggression, if the Ayodhya or
Kashmir policies are made dependent on the assent of
mujahedin either inside India or in the Muslim countries.
Strategically however, it is very useful and timely, that
an unsuspected secularist points to the danger of jihad.
While Hindus would be politically justified in ignoring
such undemocratic and terrorist threats, in terms of
strategy they should think twice before provoking a
reaction for which they are not prepared.
When the Shilanyas ceremony took place, thirty-five
Muslim countries have protested. At that time, there was
no call for jihad. If we add pan-Islamic solidarity to
the call for jihad, then India is in for some serious
trouble. However, at the time of writing, no Islamic
country has voiced any threat against India. So far it
is only the secularists who have tried to intimidate the
Ram Mandir campaigners with threats of international
Muslim retaliation.
As part of the same effort, they have also been accusing
the Ram activists of endangering the safety of the Hindus
in Muslim countries. This effectively means that, in
the secularists' perception, those minority Hindus are
really hostages, and the secularists are supporting the
anti-Janmabhoomi demands of the hostage-takers, the
Muslim majorities in Pakistan, Bangla Desh, Malaysia.
"Be good, otherwise something very unpleasant will
happen", so the secularists say, repeating the canonical
line of hostage-takers.
Even if those countries with Hindu minorities are Islamic
republics, they still have laws against looting, arson,
temple- destruction, and rape and slaughter of citizens
even if these belong to the minorities. Moreover, India
has treaties with Pakistan (inherited also by its partial
successor state Bangla Desh) concerning the safety of the
minorities. As for actual jihad from Muslim countries
against India, there are international treaties (as well
Nehru's famous "five principles of peaceful co-
existence", accepted by the Non-Aligned Movement to which
many Muslim countries belong) prescribing respect for a
nation's sovereignty, and guaranteeing non-interference
in internal affairs, and non-aggression. All these
safeguards against aggression on Hindus and India are a
juridical reality.
However, in the present discourse, our secularists have
exchanged these realities belonging to the level of
Right, for the logic of brute Power. They choose to
treat the situation not in juridical but in strategic
terms. Maybe they are right. But then it implies that
"the friendship with the Arab countries that Nehru so
wisely built", which in the spring of 1990 had seemed
to hold out against Pakistan's attempt to rally support
for its claim on Kashmir, is not resistant even to the
Ayodhya affair, i.e. the relocation of one non-mosque.
What kind of friendship is this, where a sovereign act
can get punished with jihad ? To say the least, this is
not a tribute to Nehru's international legacy by his
otherwise devout followers.
This jihad will also (if not primarily) come from inside
India : "Even on a domestic level, there are likely to be
serious problems. So far, we have been spared Muslim
terrorist groups, at least outside Kashmir, but for how
long ?" Tavleen Singh even quotes a Muslim leader
saying : "Once Muslims feel that the state is not going
to protect them and they are on their own, it is only a
question of time before they start doing what the Sikhs
are doing in Punjab. As it is, when we visit a town
after a communal riot, people say : if the police wasn't
there, we could take the Hindus on."
It is an interesting though experiment, what Tavleen
Singh presents here. Some people will say that already
the riots are mostly started by Muslims and that they too
are a form of terror. Even if that is true, there is
still an essential difference with a real terrorist
campaign : there is no well-defined and persistent demand
animating each of those separate instances of violence.
What would the explicit objective be around which an all-
India Muslim terrorist campaign would rally ? Does she
really think that this miserable non-mosque is a
sufficient occasion to get such a terrorist campaign
going ?
Then Tavleen Singh assesses the Sikh reaction. In
Amritsar, she talked to a lot of Sikh militant
leaders, who almost all of them brought up the Ayodhya
issue. Incidentally, I know decent anti-fanatical Sikhs
who would get killed if they went near Tavleen's militant
friends, merely because they call terrorists by their
proper name. In November 1990, the Sikh terrorists have
issued orders to the press, one of these being that no
negative terms like terrorist can be applied to
them.123 It struck me that most secularists in the press
are not affected by the death threats issued to
journalists who don't fall in line, because they already
use the terrorist-friendly (or at least neutral)
language. It does not in the least surprise me that
Tavleen Singh is on such good terms with the militants.
After all, the main plank in the separatist and the
secularist platforms is the same : We are not Hindus.
So, the militants told her that "they felt now that the
struggle for Khalistan was entirely justified because if
the minorities in India could not even be ensured
protection for their places of worship then Indian
secularism is nothing but a lie". This statement calls
for some serious comment.
Let me point out first of all that no place of worship of
any minority is threatened by the building of the Ram
Mandir. The place has already been a functioning Hindu
temple since 1949. If at that time it was a functioning
mosque (which is very doubtful, see ch.4.1.), then a
minority place of worship was not properly protected at
that time, in 1949, the glory years of Jawaharlal Nehru.
But now that it is a Hindu temple of long standing, the
whole affair really concerns a simple architectural
reform entirely internal to the Hindu community. It is
the fault of press people like Tavleen Singh, that people
inside and outside India have come to believe that a
mosque is threatened.
As the Chinese philosopher Confucius has pointed out, we
can only begin to set the world in order, if we call
things by their proper names. This whole Ayodhya problem
would not have existed if secularist politicians and
intellectuals had called the disputed building a non-
mosque and an effective Hindu temple. Because that is
what it is : a building containing idols is by definition
not a mosque, and a building not used for namaz is in
effect not a mosque. But a building where Hindus come to
worship idols, is called a temple or Mandir.
But now the damage has been done. With their false
language, the secularists have convinced crores of people
that the Ayodhya dispute is a struggle between majority
Mandir and minority Masjid. So, the militants think
that the minorities are under threat.
The second damage that has been done, with full co-
operation of the secularists, is that the status of
Sikhism as a separate religion has become firmly
established in the minds of many Sikhs. This separate
status is entirely a British fabrication, later amplified
by Sikh who, like many Hindus, had come to think that
being a Hindu is a shameful thing. The Sikhs have always
been one of Hinduism's many panths (sects). The claim to
being a separate religion, which is now being propped up
in many anti-Hindu books, has been conclusively disposed
of by Rajendra Singh Nirala, an ex-granthi who came to
realize that what the Akalis told him was not the same as
what he used to recite from the Granth.124
Nonetheless, it is the secularists, including Khushwant
Singh (the dirty old man of Indian secularism), who
have been championing the Sikhs' right to preserve their
communal identify.125 As if any Hindu has
challenged
that right or even just asked them to drop their
distinctive ways : it is not Hindu pressure, but the
impact of modernity that was making Sikhs shed those
outer emblems that constitute their distinctness. It is
again the secularists who, with their anti-Hindu
propensities have laid the blame for Sikh separatism at
the door of those Hindus who restate the demonstrable
historical truth that Sikhs are nothing but a Hindu
sect. Assimilative communalism, they call it. When
Hindu historians point out the radical and irreducible
difference between Hinduism and the closed monotheistic
creeds like Islam, they are dubbed communalists; but
when the same people point out the radical sameness of
Sikhism and other varieties of Hinduism, then for that
they are again dubbed communalists.
Anyway, the situation today is that the armed
representatives of the Sikh community (remark that
Tavleen Singh only quotes militant Sikhs : in the
strategic assessment they are indeed the ones who count)
consider themselves a separate non-Hindu minority, and
identify with the Muslim communalist viewpoint on
Ayodhya. They don't want to see anymore how many times
the name Ram is reverentially mentioned in the Guru
Granth Sahib126, and what horror Guru Nanak has
expressed
at Babar's Islamic acts of mass slaughter However, it is
yet something else to suggest (as they seem to do) a
causal relation between the Ram Janmabhoomi movement and
the fact that "they felt now that the struggle for
Khalistan was entirely justified".
The contention that the Ayodhya events could add one
percent to their 100% dedication to the Khalistan cause,
is nothing but rhetoric. If the Hindus give up their Ram
Mandir, the Khalistani terrorists will not fire one
bullet less, let alone give up their demand for
Khalistan. Before the Ram Mandir became hot news, they
already felt justified in killing dozens of people
every week, for Khalistan. Postulating a causal link
between Ram Janmabhoomi and Khalistani terrorism, is just
a ploy to lay the blame for their communalist crimes at
someone else's door. And of course, the secularists,
from V.P. Singh to Tavleen Singh, rhetorically support
them in their ploy.
9.3 Victory through more concessions ?
Passing the buck from the machinegun-wielding
communalists in the Khalistani camp, to the Ram
campaigners with their tridents and Ram hymns, Tavleen
Singh writes : "Ironic, isn't it, that those who believe
that Ayodhya has become the symbol of Indian nationalism
and that Hindutva is virtually synonymous with
patriotism, could well be responsible for dividing the
country once more." Ironic, isn't it, that those who
lecture others on being responsible for dividing the
country, and who declare that secularism is virtually
synonymous with patriotism, are effectively giving the
armed separatists a good conscience by putting the blame
for their communalist crimes on people who merely want to
renovate their own Ram temple.
By now, the reader should understand fully why Tavleen
Singh is such a welcome guest in militant circles. The
Khalistani terrorists say : If you can have your Ram
Mandir, we must have our Khalistan. And Tavleen Singh
says : If you really want your Ram Mandir, you should be
ready for Khalistan. The terrorists don't talk in terms
of rights, but in military power terms ("facing the
consequences"). Tavleen Singh helps us think about the
matter in those same terms.
Tavleen Singh's pious advice to the Janmabhoomi activists
is this : "A temple built beside the mosque would be a
far more powerful symbol of Indian nationalism than a
temple built in place of a mosque." Well how utterly
ignorant. In the 18th and 19th century, the Hindus
worshipped Ram on a platform just next to the Babri
Masjid. That didn't stop the Muslims from attacking the
nearby Hanumangarhi temple in 1855. The Hindus
accommodated themselves with the mosques that replaced the
Hindu temples in Mathura and Varanasi, by building a
temple next to them : that didn't stop the Muslim League
from creating Pakistan and committing countless
atrocities on the Hindus. When in 1905 the Akalis threw
out the "Hindu" idols from their Gurudwara, Pandit M.M.
Malaviya refrained from even protesting, and built a new
idol temple next to it. That didn't stop the Akalis from
developing into a separatist movement.
So, one more Hindu concession, viz. building the new
temple next to the existing structure, is certainly not a
"powerful" symbol. It may be nice, it may be harmless,
but it is by no means powerful. India is full of
examples (not mere symbols) of Hindu accommodation, but
that has not stopped the separatist movements from
multiplying and hardening their demands. The Indian
Constitution is a mighty case of Hindu accommodation to
some minorities' demands for privileges, but that hasn't
stopped the Khalistanis from burning it, nor has it
stopped the Babri Masjid movement from calling for a
boycott of Republic Day 1987.
If the Muslims would finally take their turn at making
concessions, and agree to let the Hindus build their
Mandir, and then build their own Masjid next to it, that
would indeed be a powerful symbol of Indian nationalism.
But Tavleen Singh is fooling someone if she thinks that
yet another Hindu concession is going to mollify any
armed separatist.127 Such people have only respect
for
strength. In fact, even ordinary people have more
respect for strength than for pliability. All these
cries of "We are not Hindus", which are mostly coupled
with separatist demands, are partly the result of the
over-all image of weakness which Hinduism has continued
to acquire during the last few centuries. Nobody wants
to belong to such a weak community with so little self-
respect. The day Hinduism shows strength, all these
separatists will proudly declare : "We are Hindus". They
will even shout at each other: "We are better Hindus than
you".
Summing up, we must thank Tavleen Singh for not
pontificating about secular principles, and for rightly
pointing out that this is fast becoming a matter of
strength more than of principles. Guns are pointed at
India, or rather at Hindu India, and if Hindus don't
behave nicely, they will justify Khalistani terrorism
and provoke Muslim terrorism, and then "we need to be
prepared to deal with the spread of the AK-47 on an
undreamed-of scale".
What does this state of affairs have to say about four
decades of secularism ? Apparently, something has gone
wrong. Let us take a closer look at that peculiarly
Indian variety of secularism. We need to plunge deep
into fundamentals and initiate a thorough diagnosis,
because this patient is gravely ill.
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